Can gait biometrics be spoofed? by Hadid, Abdenour et al.
Can Gait Biometrics be Spoofed?
A. Hadid, M. Ghahramani, V. Kellokumpu, M. Pietik¨ ainen
Center for Machine Vision Research, University of Oulu, Finland
J. Bustard & M. Nixon
School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, United Kingdom
Abstract
Gait recognition is a relatively new biometrics and
no effort has yet been devoted to studying spooﬁng
attacks against video-based gait recognition systems.
Spooﬁngoccurswhenapersontriestoimitatethecloth-
ing and/or walking style of someone else in order to
gainillegitimateaccessandadvantages. Togaininsight
into the performance of current gait biometric systems
when confronted to spooﬁng attacks, we provide in this
paper the ﬁrst investigation in the research literature
on how clothing can be used to spoof a target and eval-
uate the performance of two state-of-the-art recognition
methods on a novel gait spooﬁng database recorded at
the University of Southampton. The experiments point
out very interesting ﬁndings that can be used as a ref-
erence for future investigations by the research commu-
nity.
1. Introduction
Gait biometrics aims to recognise people from their
way of walking. It is a relatively new biometric modal-
ity and has a precious advantage over other modalities,
such as iris and voice, in that it can be easily captured
from a distance. This makes it an attractive option in
video surveillance applications. Gait also works in a
non-contact and non-invasive manner. It has recently
become a topic of great interest in biometric research.
Furthermore, it is widely believed that gait is difﬁcult to
hide or replicate.
Using gait information, people can be recognized by
silhouette or model based approaches [3]. There have
been more approaches which use the human silhouette,
and of these, approaches which use the averaged silhou-
ette have proved most popular [4]. Much of the earlier
work was conducted on data acquired using controlled
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conditions but more recent work reported recognition
using data derived outdoors, though with slightly lower
performance.
There are many databases for evaluating progress in
gait recognition research such as HiD (NIST, US) [5],
Soton (Southampton UK) [7], and CASIA (CAS,
China) [9] databases. The earliest databases contained
data from only tens of subjects, sometimes wearing
speciﬁed clothing. More recent databases include many
more people, outdoor as well as indoor data (thus
with uncontrolled illumination) and variation in camera
viewpoints.
There has been no or little investigation into gait
spooﬁng attacks where a person tries to imitate the
clothing or walking style of someone else e.g. in order
to gain illegitimate access and advantages (see Figure 1
for an imitation illustration). The only prior work on
gait spooﬁng [1] uses wearable sensors but not video-
based analysis: the spooﬁng attacks were performed
against an accelerometer based gait recognition system
where users needed to have devices attached to their
legs in order to obtain a gait signature. The main con-
clusion is that gait is potentially difﬁcult to spoof as it
is behavioural and encompasses the whole body. How-
ever, tothebestofourknowledge, thereisnopriorwork
on gait spooﬁng from visual data. Perhaps, the most ap-
pealing approach to use computer vision techniques to
analyse the spooﬁng attacks against gait biometric sys-
tems is to replicate the silhouette of the target e.g. by
wearing clothing that makes an attacker’s body shape
appear the same as the target. This is probably the most
straightforward and unobtrusive method for perform-
ing the attacks especially against silhouette based gait
recognition systems which have been the focus of much
of the existing research and on which the ﬁrst commer-
cial gait recognition system is currently being based.
To gain insight into the factors that may have a sig-
niﬁcant effect on spooﬁng silhouette based gait biomet-
ric systems, we provide in this paper the ﬁrst inves-
tigation on how clothing can be used to spoof a tar-Figure 1. How well one can mimic the clothing/walking styles of another person? For instance,
thousands of Beatles’ fans imitate the famous walking across Abbey Road, London, every year.
get and evaluate the performance of two state-of-the-art
recognition methods on a novel gait spooﬁng database
recorded at the University of Southampton. As this
is the ﬁrst clothing-based spooﬁng attack in the re-
search literature, our investigation focuses on the sim-
plest form of attack, which is to replicate the clothing of
the target. This is an important potential vulnerability
as such an attack is relatively straightforward. It is also
likely that such an approach will already be used by an
attacker to unobtrusively enter a secure area where uni-
forms or formalised styles of dress are common. This
is a similar approach to that of wearing a 3D mask in
order to spoof a facial recognition system. As with face
recognition, gait recognition can also be performed in
2D or 3D. For comprehensiveness, we study both ap-
proaches as they may have different vulnerabilities to
spooﬁng.
2. Baseline Gait Biometric Systems
We considered two state-of-the-art systems devel-
oped at the universities of Southampton (USOU) and
Oulu (UOULU). The USOU recognition system is a 3D
gait approach and the UOULU system uses 2D data.
3Dgaitrecognitionsystemshavetheadvantageofusing
multiple synchronised and calibrated cameras, making
video based replay attacks impractical. 3D approaches
also address the difﬁculty of recognising subjects from
different viewpoints therefore requiring that any spoof-
ing strategy is effective when viewed from any direc-
tion. 2D approaches, using only one camera, are usu-
ally more practical as they are simpler to implement and
to deploy in real-world applications. When efﬁciently
combining the shape and motion cues, the performance
of 2D approaches may easily reach that of 3D counter-
parts.
USOU Gait Recognition System: 3D volumetric data
is used to synthesise silhouettes from a ﬁxed view-
point relative to the subject. The 3D volume is syn-
thesised from eight synchronised camera views using
shape from silhouette applied to the results of standard
background subtraction approaches. The resulting sil-
houettes are then passed to a standard gait analysis tech-
nique using the average 3D silhouette [8]. The derived
average silhouette is scale normalised so that it is 50
pixels high, whilst preserving the aspect ratio. The av-
erage silhouette is treated as the feature vector and used
for veriﬁcation via the Euclidean distance metric be-
tween samples.
UOULU Gait Recognition System: The dynamic tex-
ture based gait recognition system [2] of the University
of Oulu (Finland) uses 2D dynamic texture descriptors,
namely Local Binary Patterns from Three Orthogonal
Planes (LBP-TOP), to describe human gait in a spatio-
temporal way. A video sequence of a person’s walking
is thought as spatio-temporal volume. The LBP-TOP
description is formed by calculating the LBP features
from XY, XT and YT planes of volumes and concate-
nating the histograms to catch the transition information
in spatio-temporal domain. Gentle AdaBoost is used to
perform feature selection and to build a strong classiﬁer.
3. Gait Spooﬁng Datasets
TheSouthamptongaitdatabase[6], oneofthelargest
gait databases, is considered for the experimental eval-
uation. It contains multiple views and detailed cam-
era calibration information. The database consists of
recordings of subjects walking through the Southamp-
tonGaitTunnelatleast9times. Eachrecordingconsists
of 8 synchronised video sequences of approximately
140 frames. 113 subjects were randomly selected for
computing the baseline performance of the systems i.e.
the performance when the systems are not confronted
to spooﬁng attacks. Nine recordings of each of the 113
subjects were used, one for enrolment and eight for test-
ing. This leads to one enrolment video for each user and
8113 test client (positive sample) videos for each user.
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Figure 2. Gait biometric performance under different kinds of spooﬁng attacks.
Whenproducingimpostorscoresalltheotherclientsare
used, yielding in 8112113 impostor attacks.
To analyze the performance under spooﬁng at-
tacks, new data (referred to as USOU Gait Spooﬁng
Database) has recently been recorded at the Univer-
sity of Southampton. This consists of 22 subjects (14
male and 8 female), between 20-55 years old. The sub-
jects were recorded walking through the same tunnel
in both their normal clothes and whilst wearing a com-
mon uniform. By having every subject wear the same
clothes, the degree to which one subject could imper-
sonate another by mimicking their clothes can be inves-
tigated. The uniform clothing appearance was achieved
by having subjects wear white overalls over their nor-
malclothes. Eachrecordingofnormaloruniformcloth-
ing was repeated between 10 and 35 times depending on
subject availability.
4. Experimental Investigations
We investigated different spooﬁng scenarios includ-
ing (i) clothing impersonation, (ii) deliberate selection
of a target that has a similar build to the attacker and
(iii) combination of clothing and target selection. This
yielded in 4 protocols for studying gait under spooﬁng
attacks:
a) Baseline performance in which the original
Southampton gait database without spooﬁng attacks
was considered by computing only client and impos-
tor scores. This provides the performance under normal
settings.
b) Clothing attacks are calculated by comparing each
of the uniform recordings of each subject against the
uniform recordings of all of the other subjects. This
provides insights into how clothing affects the perfor-
mance.
c) Targeted attacks are measured by comparing each
of the normal clothes recordings of each subject against
each of the normal clothes recordings of the subject
with most similar build. This provides insights into how
selection of the target affects the performance.
d) Targeted clothing attacks are the same as targeted
attacks except that instead of using the normal cloth-
ingrecordingstheuniformclothingrecordingsareused.
This is equivalent to each subject selecting the per-
son with the most similar build and impersonating their
clothing.
The results of our experiments are shown in Fig-
ure 2 in terms of detection error trade-off (DET) proﬁles
which illustrate the dynamic behaviour of the two gait
veriﬁcation systems (UOULU and USOU) as the deci-
sion thresholds are changed. The DET curves shows
how the false acceptance rate varies according to the
false rejection rate. The percentage of successful at-
tacks is equivalent to the false accept rate of the sys-
tems when attacked. The lowest proﬁles (curves la-
belled baseline in Figure 2) are that of the baseline per-
formance when the systems are not confronted to at-
3(a) baseline (b) targeted+clothing
Figure 3. Score distributions showing the overlap between the true claimants and the attacks.
tacks. They are important to gain insight into the effect
of the spooﬁng as our focus is on the degradation in per-
formance caused by spooﬁng attacks relative to these
baselines.
The curves labelled clothing shows the average false
accept rate when attackers replicate the clothing of their
target but are unable to select which person they are at-
tacking. This curve shows that clothing impersonation
does convey a small advantage, increasing the Equal Er-
ror Rate (EER) from 6% to 12% for the USOU 3D gait
system and from 4% to 28% for the UOULU 2D gait
system.
The curves labelled targeted show how effective
spooﬁng attempts are when an attacker selects a target
that is most similar to them without also impersonating
their clothing. In terms of equal error rate these kinds of
attacksseemtobelesseffectivethanclothingimperson-
ation. Finally, the curves that combine target selection
and clothing impersonation show signiﬁcant raise in the
equal error rates compared to the baseline performance,
thus indicating serious vulnerabilities to such combined
attacks. This can also be seen in the score distributions
in Figure 3 showing a clear overlap between the score
distributions of the true claimants and the attacks on the
2D gait system.
5. Conclusion
We analysed for the ﬁrst time the effects of spooﬁng
attacks on silhouette based gait biometric systems. Our
thorough investigations showed that it is indeed possi-
ble to spoof such systems especially when selecting the
person with the most similar build and impersonating
their clothing. The answer to the question in the title
of this paper is then gait biometrics may be spoofed but
perhaps not as easily as spooﬁng face biometrics which
can easily be done using a simple photograph of the en-
rolled person’s face whereas gait spooﬁng may require
much more efforts e.g. to impersonate the clothing and
walking style, and to select a target with a similar build
to the attacker.
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